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1. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887).
2. See Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1915) (upholding a municipal ordinance
declaring that, in particular circumstances and particular localities, a livery stable, which is not a nuisance
per se, shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law, and holding that the only limitation upon the power
was that it could not be exerted arbitrarily or with unjust discrimination); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 412 (1915) (upholding a municipal ordinance prohibiting the construction of a brick-kiln within the
city limits of Los Angeles); Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926)
(upholding a municipal zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power against a constitutional
challenge); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 343 (2002)
(upholding a temporary moratorium on the development of private property surrounding Lake Tahoe as a
valid exercise of police power).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAND-USE REGULATION
A. Growth Management Powers Generally
The police power of a state includes the authority of its local governments
to protect the health, morals, and safety of the communities they govern.1
Managing the growth of a community through the placement and timing of
private development has repeatedly been found a valid exercise of this police
power.  As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Hadacheck v.2
Sebastian:
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3. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410. See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
(upholding the proposition that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.”).
4. See John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform,
30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2006) (describing the national Land Use Policy and Planning
Assistance Act in the 1970s).
5. Id.
6. The Consolidated Plan requires local governments seeking federal funds for certain programs
to perform an analysis of the local housing market, examination of barriers to affordable housing, and the
development of strategies for the creation of affordable housing. 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.210–.220 (2010).
7. JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW §§ 2.6–7, at 22–24 (2003).
8. Id. §§ 2.7, 2.13, at 23, 34–35. California, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota, and Vermont have prevented this confusion by defining the
separateness of these documents by either court decision or by statute. See Edward J. Sullivan & Thomas
G. Pelham, Comprehensive Planning and Growth Management, 28 URB. LAW. 819 passim (1996).
9. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 17–20.
10. Id. at 17.
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers of
government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise,
usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any
limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be asserted
against it because of conditions once obtaining. . . . To so hold would preclude
development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be progress,
and if in its march private interests are in the way, they must yield to the good of the
community. The logical result of petitioner’s contention would seem to be that a city
could not be formed or enlarged against the resistance of an occupant of the ground, and
that if it grows at all it can only grow as the environment of the occupations that are
usually banished to the purlieus.3
Modern growth management, as implemented through land use controls,
has been left solely to state governments.  The federal government’s most4
recent foray into this area of regulation was heavily criticized and pejoratively
labeled “federal zoning.”  The federal government, however, continues to5
exert some influence over the control of land uses through its Consolidated
Plan requirements.  Two key tools comprise virtually all modern growth6
management strategies implemented by local governments: comprehensive
planning and comprehensive zoning.  These two related but distinct growth7
management devices have caused much confusion for local governments.8
Modern-day comprehensive planning arose in part from public
movements to sanitize and beautify cities that were both unhealthy and
unsightly as a result of America’s rapid industrialization.  The notion of9
comprehensive planning, however, has its roots in colonial America.  The10
most notable and influential plan of the colonial era was the plan for the new
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11. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING 9–10 (William I. Goodman & Eric C. Freund
eds., 4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter URBAN PLANNING].
12. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 352 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
13. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209, 210 (N.Y. 1920).
14. URBAN PLANNING, supra note 11, at 349.
15. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 27.
16. ROY R. CARRIKER, COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN FLORIDA (Univ.
of Fla. Food & Econ. Dep’t, EDIS Document No. FE642, 2006), http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/
FE/FE64200.pdf.
17. PA. DEPT. OF CMTY. & ECON. DEV., THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN IN PENNSYLVANIA,
GOVERNOR’S CENTER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES 6 (7th ed. 2001), available at http://
www.newpa.com/get-local-gov-support/publications/download.aspx?id=342 [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN].
18. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 28.
City of Philadelphia.  The origin of comprehensive zoning by local11
governments is also traceable to colonial America.  The first comprehensive12
zoning ordinance was adopted by New York City. Four years after its
adoption, the ordinance was upheld “as a proper exercise of the police power”
by the Court of Appeals of New York.13
1. Comprehensive Planning Components
The comprehensive plan “serves as an overall set of goals, objectives, and
policies to guide” the local legislative body in its decision making in regard
to the physical development of the community.  Such plans often serve as the14
“rational basis” upon which comprehensive zoning decisions are grounded.15
Depending upon the particular requirements of a jurisdiction, a comprehensive
plan may or may not be adopted as law by the local government. The State of
Florida, for instance, enacted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning
and Land Development Act of 1985 (codified at Chapter 163, Florida
Statutes). It requires local governments to adopt and amend existing plans for
consistency with the State and Regional plans. Failure to do so will result in
loss of state revenue-sharing to local governments and loss of grant money
controlled by the state government.  Pennsylvania recently moved in a similar16
direction by amending its growth management legislation to require “state
agencies to consider and rely upon comprehensive plans . . . when making
infrastructure decisions that impact land use.”  The four defining components17
of a comprehensive plan include its future-orientation, its continuity, its basis
upon present and projected conditions, and its focus on equity.18
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19. Id. at 31–33.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Palatine Nat’l Bank v. Vill. of Barrington, 532 N.E.2d 955, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding
that “[o]ne of the more important factors the court considers in determining the reasonableness of a
proposed [zoning change] is whether the community has given care and consideration to the use and
development of the land. The existence of a comprehensive plan indicates the community has given careful
consideration to the orderly utilization of the property within its borders.”); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Twp.,
131 A.2d 1, 7–8 (N.J. 1957) (arising prior to the enactment of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-62 which now
requires the enactment of certain elements of a formal comprehensive plan by local governments); Udell
v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900–01 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that “[t]he comprehensive plan is the essence of
zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare
is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll.”).
2. Current Role of Comprehensive Planning
The majority of states do not mandate the adoption of comprehensive
plans by local governments.  The non-regulatory status of comprehensive19
planning derives mainly from the 1920s standard planning and zoning
legislation promulgated by the Department of Commerce.  As Julian20
Juergensmeyer and Thomas Roberts explain:
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act required that zoning regulations and zoning
decisions be made “in accordance with the comprehensive plan,” but failed to address the
obvious question of what a comprehensive plan was. Later, the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act of 1928, while boldly setting forth the suggested “elements” of
comprehensive plans, and the manner in which a city might prepare and adopt them,
failed to strictly define the legal relationship between plans and zoning ordinances. In
addition, plans were optional under the Standard City Planning Enabling Act.21
As most jurisdictions went no further than adopting the language of the
model acts in defining the relationship between comprehensive planning and
comprehensive zoning, the duty to define this relationship fell to the courts.22
3. Comprehensive Zoning Components
Comprehensive zoning, as contrasted with comprehensive planning, is the
“division of a municipality (or other governmental unit) into districts, and the
regulation within those districts of: (i) the height and bulk of building and
other structures; (ii) the area of a lot which may be occupied and the size of
required open spaces; (iii) the density of population; and (iv) the use of
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23. URBAN PLANNING, supra note 11, at 403 (referring to the definition of comprehensive zoning
used by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1924 Standard Zoning Enabling Act, on which most
current legislation is based).
24. Id.
25. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365.
26. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 43.
27. Id. at 41; URBAN PLANNING, supra note 11, at 403 (referring to the definition of comprehensive
zoning used by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1924 Standard Zoning Enabling Act, on which
most current legislation is based).
28. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 41.
29. URBAN PLANNING, supra note 11, at 404.
30. Id.
31. Id.
buildings and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.”23
According to Goodman and Freund:
Zoning is essentially a means of insuring that the land uses of a community are properly
situated in relation to one another, providing adequate space for each type of
development. It allows the control of development density in each area so that property
can be adequately serviced by such governmental facilities as the street, school,
recreation, and utilities systems. This directs new growth into appropriate areas and
protects existing property by requiring that development afford adequate light, air and
privacy for person living and working within the municipality.24
Comprehensive zoning, in its present form, became immensely popular in the
first part of the 20th Century. By the time the Village of Euclid’s zoning
ordinance was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1926,  56425
municipalities had enacted zoning measures.26
4. Current Role of Comprehensive Zoning
Comprehensive zoning remains the core tool of land-use regulation.27
While the essence of comprehensive zoning (i.e., the division of a
municipality into districts) has remained fundamentally unchanged, the
adoption of new control techniques within zoning regimes has significantly
altered comprehensive zoning from its original form.28
Comprehensive zoning is distinguished from the exercise of other
municipal powers because the zoning regulations differ from district to
district.  Building codes or sanitary regulations, in contrast, apply uniformly29
throughout an entire municipality.  This distinction creates a substantial risk30
of arbitrary treatment toward individual property owners.  Recognizing this31
threat, legislatures (through zoning enabling acts), and courts (through
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32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 405.
35. URBAN PLANNING, supra note 11, at 405.
36. Pa. Muns. Plan. Code, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101–11202 (West 2010).
37. PENNSYLVANIA COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 17, at 10.
common law), have developed general limitations on the exercise of zoning
authority.  These limitations include the following general requirements:32
(i) regulations within a district must be uniform for each class of building,
(ii) there must be a reasonable basis for classifying particular areas, (iii) the
ordinance must cover the entire jurisdiction of the municipality, and (iv) the
regulations must be reasonable in their application to particular properties.33
5. Consistency Between Comprehensive Planning and Comprehensive
Zoning
The confusion mentioned earlier regarding comprehensive planning and
comprehensive zoning arises mainly from the adoption of comprehensive
zoning regulations by municipalities that fail to also adopt comprehensive
planning regulations.  Comprehensive zoning, in theory, is intended only to34
be one of several administrative tools available to municipalities to carry out
a comprehensive plan.35
For much of the time municipalities have been empowered to regulate
land use in Pennsylvania, there was no requirement that municipalities adopt
a comprehensive plan. In 2000, this began to change as amendments to
Pennsylvania’s enabling land-use planning legislation provided incentives for
municipalities to adopt a comprehensive plan.  Comprehensive plans continue36
to remain optional, however. Describing the role of the comprehensive plan
in Pennsylvania in 2001, The Comprehensive Plan in Pennsylvania explains:
A municipality is not required to regulate land use, but if it decides to implement zoning,
it must have a well-articulated statement of community development objectives.
Objectives should be supported by sufficient analysis and documentation to defend the
zoning or other land use ordinances of the community against legal challenges. Preparing
a comprehensive plan provides the most effective basis for the development of land use
ordinances.37
Implicit in the last sentence is the notion that there are other bases from which
to defend comprehensive zoning or other land-use regulations. This statement
is certainly placing the functions of the comprehensive plan and
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38. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Affordable Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/
affordablehousing/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Karen Destorel Brown, Expanding Affordable Housing Through Exclusionary Zoning: Lessons
from the Washington Metropolitan Area 1 (Brookings Inst. Ctr. on Urban & Metro. Policy, 2001),
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/inclusionary.pdf.
43. As of 2007, there was an estimated deficit of 5.5 million affordable rental units available to
Extremely Low Income households. Extremely Low Income households have an income at or below 30%
of the area’s median income. In 2009, this income equaled $19,596. See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL.
[NLIHC], OUT OF REACH 2009: PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, NEW CHALLENGES FOR RENTERS 4–5 (2009),
available at http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2009/oor2009pub.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: Local-
comprehensive zoning in correct relation to one another. It still, however,
allows comprehensive zoning legislation to be sufficient in and of itself.
II. AFFORDABLE HOUSING GENERALLY
A. Defining Affordable Housing
Affordable housing is defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development as housing that costs (including rent, utilities, property
taxes, and insurance) less than 30 percent of a household’s total income.38
Households that pay more than this amount are considered “housing
burdened,” and consequently will be able to afford less of other necessities
such as food, clothing, transportation, and health care.  Nationally, more than39
12 million households pay more than 50 percent of their annual income for
housing costs.  More disturbing, perhaps, is the data showing that a family40
with one full-time worker earning the minimum wage cannot afford the local
fair-market rent for a two-bedroom apartment anywhere in the United States.41
Two trends have effectively driven the affordable housing dilemma in the
United States. First, wages and income have not kept pace with the ever
increasing costs of daily living such as transportation, health insurance, child
care, and housing.  Second, the availability of affordable housing units has42
continually decreased.43
B. The Current Housing-Wage
To illustrate the severity of this country’s affordable housing condition,
commentators frequently use a number referred to as the “housing wage.”44
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Resident Equity Partnership in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 69 n.157 (2006); John A.
Powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 188, 192 (2003).
45. See NLIHC, supra note 43, at 4.
46. “FMRs are gross rent estimates. They include the shelter rent plus the cost of all tenant-paid
utilities, except telephones, cable or satellite television service, and internet service. HUD sets FMRs to
assure that a sufficient supply of rental housing is available to program participants. To accomplish this
objective, FMRs must be both high enough to permit a selection of units and neighborhoods and low
enough to serve as many low-income families as possible. The level at which FMRs are set is expressed as
a percentile point within the rent distribution of standard-quality rental housing units. . . . Standard-quality
rental housing units have the following attributes: Occupied rental units paying cash rent; Specified renter
on 10 acres or less; With full plumbing; With full kitchen; Unit more than 2 years old, and Meals not
included in rent.” OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR
MARKET RENTS FOR THE SECTION 8 HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2 (2010),
available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr/fmrover_071707R2.doc.
47. NLIHC, Pittsburgh HMFA, http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2009/data.cfm?getstate=on&getmsa=
on&msa=2279&state=PA (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
48. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49. NLIHC, Pittsburgh HMFA, supra note 47.
50. Assuming 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year.
51. NLIHC, Pittsburgh HMFA, supra note 47.
52. This wage increased to $7.25 in July 2009. 34 PA. CODE § 231.101 (2006).
53. NLIHC, Pittsburgh HMFA, supra note 47.
54. See supra note 38.
55. NLIHC, Pittsburgh HMFA, supra note 47.
56. Assuming 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year.
57. NLIHC, Pittsburgh HMFA, supra note 47.
58. Id.
This number represents the amount of income a full-time worker must earn to
secure affordable housing in the region in which she works.  In Pennsylvania,45
the Fair Market Rent  for a two-bedroom apartment is $799 per month.  To46 47
afford this rent,  a household must earn $2,644 monthly or $31,96948
annually.  Assuming a worker works 2,080  hours per year, the housing wage49 50
is $15.37 per hour worked.  A minimum-wage worker in Pennsylvania earns51
$7.15.  Consequently, for a minimum-wage worker to afford the Fair Market52
Rent for a two-bedroom apartment in Pennsylvania, she must work 86 hours
per week or be a part of a household that includes 2.1 minimum-wage
workers.
In Pittsburgh, the Fair Market Rent for a two-bedroom apartment is $710
per month.  To afford this rent,  a household must earn $2,367 monthly or53 54
$28,400 annually.  Assuming a worker works 2,080  hours per year, the55 56
housing wage is $13.65 per hour worked.  A minimum-wage worker in57
Pennsylvania earns $7.15.  For a minimum-wage worker to afford the Fair58
Market Rental for a two-bedroom apartment, she must work 76 hours a week
or be a part of a household that includes 1.9 minimum-wage workers.
2010] AFFORDABLE HOUSING OPTIONS 255
59. NLIHC, Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington MSA, http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2009/data.cfm
?getmsa=on&msa=2275&state=PA (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) [hereinafter NLIHC, Philadephia].
60. See supra note 38.
61. NLIHC, Philadelphia, supra note 59.
62. Assuming 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year.
63. NLIHC, Philadelphia, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. See OR. HOUS. & CMTY. SERVS., HOUSING AS AN ECONOMIC STIMULUS: THE ECONOMIC AND
COMMUNITY BENEFITS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 5, 21–25 (2005), available at
http://www.ohcs.oregon.gov/OHCS/docs/HousingEconomicStimulus.pdf; Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment,
Zoning For All: Using Inclusionary Zoning Techniques to Promote Affordable Housing, 44 EMORY L.J.
359, 359–60 (1995); Powell, supra note 44, at 196–97.
66. John R. Nolon, Shattering the Myth of Municipal Impotence: The Authority of Local
Government to Create Affordable Housing, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383, 384 (1989).
In Philadelphia, the Fair Market Rent for a two-bedroom apartment is
$1,005 per month.  To afford this rent,  a household must earn $3,35059 60
monthly or $40,200 annually.  Assuming a worker works 2,080  hours per61 62
year, the housing wage is $19.33 per hour worked.  A minimum-wage worker63
in Pennsylvania earns $7.15.  For a minimum-wage worker to afford the Fair64
Market Rental for a two-bedroom apartment, she must work 108 hours a week
or be a part of a household that includes 2.7 minimum-wage workers.
C. The Role of Affordable Housing in a Community
The lack of affordable housing within a municipality leads to several
notable consequences, including the lack of a balanced workforce, the lack of
businesses, the lack of economic stimulus, overcrowding of existing housing,
the provision of second-rate municipal services to these residents, fewer
educational opportunities, and increased unemployment.  As John R. Nolon65
explains:
There is a close relationship between the public welfare and an adequate stock of
affordable housing. Without affordable housing, the balanced work force needed to
attract and retain commercial and industrial development will not exist. Without business
development, the community will not enjoy the benefits of a diversified tax base. A
diversified tax base eases the pressures on residential taxpayers, creates stability for the
municipal corporation, and helps the community weather economic changes. The
development of affordable housing for the young and old, for people of low and middle
income, breathes fairness into the development pattern of a locality, and provides living
accommodations for all segments of the population. This diversified housing stock
creates a heterogeneous population and economy and an equitable distribution of housing
opportunity, thereby furthering the objectives of comprehensive planning.66
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67. See Powell, supra note 44, at 195–96.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 196.
70. Id. See also Timothy J. Choppin, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation Barrier:
Policies to Promote Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 82 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994).
71. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing
Affordability, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POLICY REV., June 2003, at 21.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
John A. Powell argues that a lack of affordable housing lessens a
community’s opportunity to provide access to wealth, employment,
transportation, childcare, education, health, and democratic participation.  In67
essence, Powell’s argument makes access to affordable housing a key
requirement for access to these other opportunities.  Describing affordable68
housing’s relationship with employment and transportation, Powell finds that:
[W]here people live in the metropolitan region plays a significant role in their
employment prospects . . . . Because long distances and traveling time restrain the ability
of people to gain and keep jobs, people tend to choose housing or to relocate in proximity
to employment sites. This is true when there is a choice in housing, but when affordable
housing is not present near job growth, this choice dissolves.69
This spatial mismatch, in turn, affects the employment and earnings of the
affordable housing population.70
D. Economic Impediments to the Construction of Affordable Housing
Professors Glaeser and Gyourko, writing for the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, respond to the general outcry of an affordable housing crisis by
sharply dissecting the issue into two, separate components—the cost of
housing and the level of poverty.  This dissection is crucial, according to71
Glaeser and Gyourko, because a governmental response comprised of
increasing housing supply to address the issue of poverty is inapposite and
therefore ineffective.  An affordable housing crisis, according to Glaeser and72
Gyourko, means that the cost of housing is expensive relative to its cost of
production; not that people are poor.  Concomitantly, Glaeser and Gyourko73
argue that the ability to pay for housing is an inaccurate benchmark for
measuring affordability.  Instead, the physical construction costs of housing74
should be used as the benchmark.  Thus, if there is indeed an affordable75
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76. Id.
77. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 71, at 22.
78. Id. at 23.
79. See Bezdek, supra note 44, at 69 n.157; Powell, supra note 44, at 192. See also supra text
accompanying note 44.
80. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 71, at 28.
81. Id. at 35.
82. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Urban Decline and Durable Housing 4, 46 (HARV. INST.
OF ECON. RESEARCH, Discussion Paper No. 1931, 2001).
83. Id. See also discussion infra Part E.1.
housing crisis, the correct response is to increase the supply of housing. As the
social cost of constructing this housing cannot be less than the cost of
constructing the increase in the supply of housing, increasing the housing
supply will ultimately lead to social costs rather than social gains.76
Using 2000 Census data and construction cost data from R.S. Means,
Glaeser and Gyourko found that generally, the price of existing housing is
close to the cost of new construction.  Analyzing housing data from different77
parts of the United States, Glaeser and Gyourko employed an empirical
analysis and concluded that America does not uniformly face an affordable
housing crisis.  Instead, as the “housing wage” across the country evidences,78
America is more likely facing a poverty crises.79
Focusing on areas of America facing relatively high housing costs in
relation to the cost of new construction, Glaeser and Gyourko examined
whether this high relative cost results from the natural inelasticity of land or
from an artificial inelasticity placed on the land by land-use regulations.  The80
results of this analysis clearly suggest that land use regulation is responsible
for the high cost of housing relative to the cost of construction where housing
costs are high.  These results hold true where the cost of housing is relatively81
high compared to the cost of new construction, but not in cities such as
Pittsburgh where the cost of housing, generally, is significantly less than the
cost of new construction.82
This research raises two important points that local governments and
proponents of government-subsidized affordable housing must recognize.
First, most government programs that address the supply of housing will have
a social cost, usually measurable as the difference between the market rate of
new construction and the selling price of the units. Second, land use
regulations do place artificial limitations on the supply of land. As discussed
in further detail below,  any type of zoning regulation places artificial limits83
on the supply of land and thus increases the cost of land. As the cost of land
constitutes approximately 20 percent of the cost of housing, the impact of land
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84. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 71, at 22.
85. Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial
Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 931 (2006) (citing James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New
Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and
Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 53 (2003)).
86. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
87. See 1 JAMES METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 9 (2d ed. 1955) (Metzenbaum represented the
Village of Euclid in the Supreme Court case upholding the constitutionality of zoning.).
88. Morgan, supra note 65, at 359.
89. Local governments may wish to promote development of land uses that have the potential to
use regulations on the cost of housing must be considered.  This second point84
potentially leaves local governments in an uncomfortable position—the
solution sought by local governments may, in fact, be the source of the
problem.
A corollary concern municipal governments must also be cognizant of is
that “[d]evelopers and home buyers unwilling to abide by land use or housing
policies in one place will take their development elsewhere.”  All of these85
considerations consequently coalesce to make the resolution to the affordable
housing problem, assuming there is one, a much more complicated issue.
E. Legal Mechanisms Available to Provide Affordable Housing
1. Exclusionary Zoning
During the proceedings leading to the initial validation of comprehensive
zoning ordinances, both the arguments for and the arguments against allowing
local governments to control private development were thoroughly
documented. Those arguing against the constitutionality of these ordinances
contended that such power, when exercised on residential housing, would lead
to local governments classifying “the population and segregat[ing] them
according to their income and station in life.”  Countering this argument was86
the position that zoning could and would be used simply as a good
housekeeping mechanism—segregating property uses that would have
detrimental effects to the community if it was not segregated.  The benefits87
of such zoning, so the argument goes, include the prevention of conflicting
land uses, the protection of property values, and the minimization of problems
associated with overcrowding and urbanization.  This practice of excluding88
land uses from segments of a community is commonly referred to as
“exclusionary zoning,” and may be driven by a wide range of motives.89
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produce high tax revenues [e.g., luxury condominiums] rather than high density, low-cost housing. Other
motives, such as the retention of open space, the preservation of property values, or the preservation of the
character of neighborhoods also exist. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 230.
90. Orfield, supra note 85, at 888 (noting that when the only type of development permitted is
associated with high-cost housing, the “siting and production [of affordable housing] becomes nearly
impossible”).
91. Exclusion of lower cost housing from a community leads to the higher cost of housing, the
promotion of urban sprawl, the increase in costs of providing municipal services, and an increased burden
upon the urban poor. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 230–31.
92. See id. at 231.
93. Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781 (1969).
94. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 231.
95. Twp. of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 962 A.2d 653 (Pa. 2009).
96. Precision Equities, Inc. v. Franklin Park Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 646 A.2d 756, 759 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994).
Whatever the local government’s motive, such zoning techniques are
viewed by some commentators as “the most common legal impediment to
affordable housing.”  Other commentators believe that exclusionary zoning90
invariably brings with it other detrimental consequences.  Local governments91
utilize many different mechanisms to effect these land-use exclusions,
including “regulations mandating a minimum lot size and minimum house
size, large lot-frontage requirements, and limitations or bans on multi-family
housing and manufactured housing.”  Land use controls such as these, which92
prescribe “substantial minimum floor area or lot size for residential
dwellings,” effectively raise the price of residential access to a zone.  These93
exclusionary regulations are generally implemented through zoning and
subdivision controls, as these are the primary land use controls available to
exclude unwanted uses.94
Challenging these apparently exclusionary ordinances is one legal
mechanism through which exclusionary zoning ordinances can be eliminated.
Landowners may challenge such ordinances either through state and local
courts or through the curative amendment process. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court most recently spoke about court challenges to exclusionary zoning in
Township of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Board.  In analyzing controversies95
raising objections of exclusionary zoning, Pennsylvania courts begin by first
recognizing the competing core interests involved.  These interests include96
that of (i) a property owner in enjoying her property under the due process
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and (ii) a municipality in placing reasonable limitations on the
use of private property through the enactment of zoning ordinances in the
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97. Twp. of Exeter, 962 A.2d at 659; see also In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d
718, 727 (Pa. 2003); Hopewell Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 452 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Pa. 1982).
98. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
99. Id. at 110; BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993).
100. Precision Equities, 646 A.2d at 759 (citing BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144 (Pa.
1993). See Surrick, 382 A.2d at 110–11 (Pa. 1977); Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341
A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970); Appeal of Girsh, 263
A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970); Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965). 
101. See Precision Equities, 646 A.2d at 759; Surrick, 382 A.2d at 110–11.
102. Krystle L. Jackson, Comment, Need for Reform: The Pennsylvania “Curative Amendment” in
Light of the National Housing Crisis, 18 WIDENER L.J. 937, 937 (2009).
103. Id. at 946.
exercise of its police power.  Courts then utilize a three-prong test (coined in97
Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board ) for determining whether a zoning98
ordinance is unconstitutionally exclusionary.  The court, in Precision99
Equities, explained the operation of the test as follows:
These core principles [private property rights and the municipality’s police power]
inspired our decisions in a line of cases collectively embracing the following view:
Where a municipal subdivision is a logical place for development to occur, it must
assume its rightful part of the burdens associated with development, neither isolating
itself nor ignoring the housing needs of the larger region. This philosophy finds concrete
expression in the “fair share” principle, which this Court has adopted. It requires local
political units to “plan for and provide land use regulations which meet the legitimate
needs of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries . . . .”100
The first two parts raise threshold inquiries focusing on a municipality’s propensity for
population growth and its capacity to accommodate additional development . . . . If a
community is a logical area for development and its present level of development does
not preclude further development, then it is necessary to conduct the third inquiry, which
focuses on determining the exclusionary impact of the zoning ordinance.101
The curative amendment process, an alternative to challenging apparently
exclusionary ordinances in state and local courts, allows landowners to
challenge local zoning ordinances by filing “curative amendments” directly
to the municipality.  The ability to challenge such policies in a102
municipality’s zoning regulations outside of state and local judicial systems
serves as a more effective weapon for proponents of affordable housing.103
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104. This is also commonly referred to as “inclusionary-housing laws.” See Orfield, supra note 85,
at 906.
105. See Laura M. Padilla, Reflections On Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its Viability,
23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 540–41 (1995).
106. Orfield, supra note 85, at 906 (explaining that inclusionary zoning laws can produce housing
developments “more acceptable to neighboring residents than traditional subsidized low-income housing
developments,” the alleviation of economic segregation, and the minimum capital outlays required by local
governments).
107. See generally Morgan, supra note 65, at 369–81.
108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 20 (West 2003).
109. Morgan, supra note 65, at 369–81 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 20 (West 2003)).
See also Emily Fabrycki Reed, Tilting at Windmills: The Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income
Housing Act, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 105, 121 (1981) (critiquing this legislation as being too narrow in
that it only applies to government subsidized housing developed by public agencies, limited dividend
corporations, or non-profit corporations).
110. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-30(a), (b) (1991).
111. Id.
112. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 (West Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161 (West 2006); OR.
REV. STAT. § 197.295 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.010 (1990). See also Florence W. Roisman,
Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the 21st Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65,
69–70 (2001) (reviewing, inter alia, statutes “requir[ing] municipalities to adopt plans for affordable
housing and otherwise to support lower-income housing”).
2. Inclusionary Zoning
Inclusionary zoning laws,  in contrast to exclusionary zoning laws,104
intend to affirmatively promote the construction of affordable housing.  In105
addition to the creation of affordable housing, commentators laud the several
concomitant benefits of inclusionary zoning laws.  A wide array of106
mechanisms are available under the umbrella-term “inclusionary zoning,”
including zoning appeals legislation, state regulation of comprehensive
planning, incentive zoning, mandatory set-asides, and housing linkage fees.107
Massachusetts is a jurisdiction that has implemented zoning appeals
legislation.  This legislation simplifies the permitting process. Additionally,108
it shifts the burden of proof to the municipality denying a permit which would
produce affordable housing units and requires it to show that the affordable
housing needs of the community are met.  Connecticut also adopted similar109
zoning-appeals legislation.  Connecticut’s legislation is distinguishable from110
Massachusetts’s legislation by its clearly broader implications, as it pertains
to both government subsidized and unsubsidized development.111
In contrast to requiring only standard, parochial zoning ordinances, a
handful of jurisdictions require that local zoning ordinances accord with local
comprehensive plans that include affordable housing elements.  The State112
of Florida, for instance, requires that local comprehensive plans include:
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113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(6)(f) (West Supp. 2010).
114. See id. § 163.3191.
115. Id. § 163.3184(11)(a).
116. Morgan, supra note 65, at 378.
117. Orfield, supra note 85, at 906.
118. See generally Nolon, supra note 66, at 392–93; Orfield, supra note 85, at 906 (stating that
“[o]ther statutory development incentives include local tax abatements, waivers of permit fees, reductions
in the amenities required to be provided by developers, and government provision or subsidization of
infrastructure in support of development”).
119. See Powell, supra note 44, at 205–06 (discussing the success of the Moderately Priced Dwelling
Unit Program in Montgomery County, Maryland which has produced over 10,000 units of affordable
housing from 1996 to 2003).
[a] housing element consisting of standards, plans, and principles to be followed in . . .
[t]he provision of adequate sites for future housing, including affordable workforce
housing . . . , housing for low-income, very low-income, and moderate-income families,
mobile homes, and group home facilities and foster care facilities, with supporting
infrastructure and public facilities.113
To give this comprehensive planning element some “teeth,” the State of
Florida requires local comprehensive plans to be reviewed at least once every
five years.  If the local comprehensive plan is found to not be in compliance114
with the elements in the Florida Growth Management Act, state funds can be
withheld by the State from projects under the province of the local
governments.115
One of the most vibrant areas of inclusionary-zoning activity is incentive
zoning. This is, perhaps, due to the inclination of local-government officials
toward inducing the relinquishment of private property rights rather than
taking private property rights. Additionally, the lack of upfront, local-
government funding for these incentives is extremely attractive to a local
official seeking to retain her office.  Moreover, as developers will likely be116
deterred by the reduced profitability associated with the construction of
affordable housing, local governments are forced to offer such incentives to
ensure that affordable housing units are in fact produced.117
One of several mechanisms that fall under the umbrella of incentive
zoning laws is the provision of zoning variances for developers of residential
housing.  In exchange for a set-aside of a prescribed percentage of affordable118
housing units in new development, local governments relax some of the
requirements of a zoning regulation to increase the intensity of proposed
development above the prescribed standard.  There are two key categories119
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120. Nolon, supra note 66, at 390–93.
121. Id. at 390–91.
122. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980)).
123. Nolon, supra note 66, at 391 n.27.
124. ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE 719 (3d ed. 1982).
125. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the application of a special-use permit for the provision
of elderly housing. Shepard v. Woodland Twp. Comm’n & Plan. Bd., 364 A.2d 1005, 1015 (N.J. 1976).
Massachusetts’s Enabling Act specifically allows for the implementation of special-use permits. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 9 (1985). The New York courts have upheld the use of special-use permits as being
within the bounds of the city’s police power. See Asian Ams. for Equality v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987), aff’d, 72 N.Y.2d 121 (N.Y. 1988).
126. Robert W. Burchell & Catherine C. Galley, Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons, NEW
CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, http://www.nhc.org/pdf/pub_nc_10_00.pdf. See also Morgan, supra note
65, at 378.
127. Brown, supra note 42, at 5.
128. Id. at 6.
of zoning variances used for the construction of affordable housing, namely
conditional rezoning of individual parcels and generic zoning.120
Conditional rezoning of individual parcels, in the context of creating
affordable housing, usually arises when a developer seeks to increase the
permitted zoning density of a particular parcel of land.  By conditioning an121
increase in allowable development density on the concession of a developer
to construct units of affordable housing, local governments must be prepared
to meet the stringent requirements of the Supreme Court’s “nexus”
jurisprudence.  According to John R. Nolon, at least, “[w]hen the local122
government, which could deny the request for rezoning, conditions the
rezoning on the provision of some affordable housing for the specific purpose
of furthering the comprehensive plan, the constitutionally required ‘nexus’
between the condition imposed and the burden created by the development is
found.”123
Generic zoning for affordable housing offers two alternatives to the
conditional zoning of individual parcels, namely special-use permits and
floating zones.  A special-use permit has been used successfully in several124
jurisdictions to permit greater density of development as a bonus to a
developer constructing affordable housing units for the elderly.  As125
commentators note, it is prudent to attach rent or price controls to these
density bonuses to ensure that the housing remains affordable.  One126
jurisdiction, to ensure this continued affordability, requires rental units to be
maintained as affordable for 20 years while requiring price restrictions on
owner-occupied units for ten years.  After the initial ten-year period, owner-127
occupied units can be sold at market rates.  However, half of the profits128
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131. The “affordability” of a housing unit is generally derived by local governments applying a
percentage to the area’s median income. See Burchell & Galley, supra note 126, at 3.
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“Private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”). The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the several states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
133. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980)). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (holding
that “a use restriction may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial government purpose”).
134. The California Coastal Commission granted a permit to the Nollans to replace a small bungalow
on their beachfront lot with a larger house upon the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass
across their beach, which was located between two public beaches. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825.
earned by the owner-occupier must be remitted to the county’s Housing
Initiative Fund.  These remitted profits are then used to aid the future129
development and rehabilitation of affordable housing.130
Another mechanism used by local governments from the inclusionary-
zoning toolkit is commonly referred to as mandatory set-asides. Essentially,
a developer within a jurisdiction with such a mechanism must include a
minimum number of affordable housing units within the market-priced
housing units.  Implementation of this mechanism raises constitutional131
concerns, however, as it forces private property owners to develop their
property at a price less than what the market will bear.  According to the132
Court, a land-use regulation “does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land.’”  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court133
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,  expounds on the Court’s view134
regarding mechanisms that condition the approval of proposed development
upon an extraction by the local government:
[A] permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal
to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit
would not constitute a taking. . . . [T]he condition would be constitutional even if it
consisted of the requirement that the [property owners] provide a viewing spot on their
property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere
. . . .
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for
the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the
prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as
if [the] law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those
willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury . . . . The purpose then becomes, quite
simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but
without payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of “legitimate state
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135. Id. at 836–37.
136. Nolon, supra note 66, at 384. See generally Marc T. Smith & Ruth L. Steiner, Affordable
Housing as an Adequate Public Facility, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 443, 445 (2002); Serena M. Williams, The
Need for Affordable Housing: The Constitutional Viability of Inclusionary Zoning, 26 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 75, 101–03 (1992).
137. Morgan, supra note 65, at 380.
138. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
139. Brown, supra note 42, at 6–7 (explaining that the MDPU program requires that any new housing
development of fifty or more units set aside twelve and one-half to fifteen percent of the units for
households earning sixty-five percent or less of the area’s median income. As compensation for building
the mandated MPDUs, developers can receive a density bonus of up to twenty-two percent.).
140. This substantive change is likely beneficial for the survival of the regulation, as courts are much
more friendly to incentive zoning regulations than mandatory set-asides. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming
Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2357 (2003).
141. See Nolon, supra note 66, at 384.
142. See Roisman, supra note 112, at 94–95. See also Brown, supra note 42, at 5.
143. See Powell, supra note 44, at 206–07.
interests” in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them. In short, unless the
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but “an out-and-out plan of
extortion.”135
Some commentators have argued that the provision of affordable housing is
a legitimate state interest.  Furthermore, as the conditions imposed by136
mandatory set-aside regulations require the construction of affordable housing
units, such mechanisms directly advance this state interest.  Thus, pursuant137
to the Court’s analysis in Nollan, as long as a mandatory set-aside regulation
for the construction of affordable housing does not “den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land,” such regulation will likely survive
constitutional challenge.  To ensure that property owners are not denied this138
viability, local governments will often provide economically beneficial
incentives such as density bonuses.  Providing economically beneficial139
incentives may shift the character of regulation to feel much more like
incentive zoning and in turn improve the regulation’s chance of surviving
legal challenges.  The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Ordinance, adopted140
in 1973 by Montgomery County, Maryland, is an example of a mandatory set-
aside ordinance that provides economic incentive to developers in exchange
for the construction of a set percentage of affordable housing units.  The141
longevity and success of this program is well documented.142
Still another mechanism used by local governments to generate affordable
housing is the application of “linkage fees” on commercial or market-rate
residential development.  The proceeds of these fees are used to fund the143
construction of affordable housing. The rationale for applying these fees to
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146. See Smith & Steiner, supra note 136, at 444 (arguing that under Florida’s concurrency
requirements a local government would (i) be able to prohibit development in certain areas, (ii) be required
to provide the infrastructure, (iii) or be able to require the developer to “bar the cost of solving the
inadequacy”).
147. See Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1915).
148. Barron, supra note 140, at 2280–81, 2285 (noting a commentator’s opinion that the impetus for
treating municipal corporations as merely “creatures of the state” likely arose from a fear that local
governments would shed their “anti-redistributive local past” for a “threatening, redistributive future”).
149. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177 (1907).
150. Barron, supra note 140, at 2285.
151. Id.
152. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, LAW OF MUN. CORPORATIONS § 237(89) (5th ed. 1911).
commercial development is that as commercial development creates jobs, it
also creates a need for affordable housing units.  The rationale for applying144
these fees to market-rate residential development is that such development
will potentially displace affordable units, and the fees are required to mitigate
this effect.  Some commentators have even argued for treating affordable145
housing as an element of a municipality’s infrastructure and therefore subject
to the jurisdiction’s concurrency requirements.146
III. CREATING AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. Pennsylvania Land Use Authority
As discussed above, the authority to manage the placement and timing of
physical development within a community has been repeatedly held as a
proper exercise of a state’s police power.  Historically, local governments,147
acting as municipal corporations, were treated as “creatures of the state” to
limit their power of initiative and assert the state’s legislative preemptive
power.  Dillon’s Rule, as adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court,  is a148 149
nineteenth century judicial rule of interpretation for decisions pertaining to
municipal governance that encapsulates this understanding of the role of local
government.  Acknowledging that the incorporation of the municipality150
impliedly provided some power (i.e., the power to administer local affairs),
the formulation of Dillon’s rule ensured that local governments did not
exercise authority beyond those powers.  As stated, Dillon’s Rule ensured151
that local governments only exercised those powers that could be traced to
express delegations from the state.  Using this construct, Pennsylvania’s152
General Assembly has expressly delegated to the vast majority of local
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153. Cf. Pennsylvania Muns. Plan, Code, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. pmbl. (2005); 53 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 10105.
154. Barron, supra note 140, at 2292–93.
155. WILLIAM D. VALENTE & DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 63 (4th ed.
1992). 
156. Joel P. Dennison, Comment, New Tricks for an Old Dog: The Changing Role of the
Comprehensive Plan Under Pennsylvania’s “Growing Smarter” Land Use Reforms, 105 DICK. L. REV.
385, 418 n.30 (2001) (citing VALENTE & MCCARTHY, supra note 155, at 63–64).
157. Cmty. Envtl. Legal Def. Fund, Home Rule for Pennsylvania, http://www.celdf.org/HomeRule/
PennsylvaniaandHomeRule/tabid/116/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 302 PA. CODE §§ 11.1-101 to 11.8-813 (2009). See also Klein v. Council of Pittsburgh, 643
A.2d 1107, 1109 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); Pessolano v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 632 A.2d 1090, 1093
n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); Sorbara v. City of Pittsburgh, 471 A.2d 927, 928 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984);
governments primary land use control.  The two notable exceptions to this153
grant, discussed below, are the City of Pittsburgh and the City of Philadelphia.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a movement emerged to
challenge the “creature of the state” vision for local governments that Dillon’s
Rule sought to perpetuate.  This movement, known generally as the “Home154
Rule” movement, was motivated by distrust of the state government to handle
local affairs.  Supporters of home rule sought the adoption of a more liberal155
view of delegated powers, and a “grant [of] authority to municipalities,
through municipal charters, to enact measures necessary to promote the
‘general welfare.’”  According to one commentator, “[h]ome rule means156
shifting responsibility for local governance from the State Legislature to the
local community . . . . [A home rule charter] is a body of law, a framework
within which the local governing body can adopt, adapt and administer
legislation and regulations for the conduct of business, expansion of citizen
participation in decision-making and creation of sustainable communities.”157
The history of home rule in Pennsylvania began in 1922 when the
Pennsylvania Constitution was amended to allow the Legislature to grant
cities the right to adopt home rule charters.  In 1949, when the General158
Assembly finally took action on this constitutional amendment, only the City
of Philadelphia was authorized to adopt such a charter.  The option for home159
rule was presented to the rest of Pennsylvania municipalities during the
Constitutional Convention of 1968–1969.  Four years later, the General160
Assembly passed the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, fulfilling
the constitutional mandate.  The residents of the City of Pittsburgh decided161
to exercise this grant of authority by adopting a home rule charter.162
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Although the City of Pittsburgh is a home rule municipality within the
protection of Pennsylvania’s Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, the
City has limited home rule derived power to regulate the placement or timing
of land development.  The Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law163
specifically curtail the powers of municipal governments to regulate the
development of land to those contained in the Municipalities Planning Code
of 1968—the express delegation of primary land-use control.  As the City of164
Pittsburgh is, in turn, not subject to the Municipalities Planning Code due to
its status as a city of the second class,  the City must derive its land-use165
regulatory authority from its “original enabling legislation and any subsequent
statutes applying to second class cities in particular or to municipalities in
general and not in the MPC.”  Thus, the City derives its zoning authority166
from Act No. 69 of 1927, its subdivision control from sections 9 through 12
of a separate 1927 Act, and its authority to adopt an official map from sections
5 through 8 and 14 through 20 of the same, separate Act.  Consequently, the167
City of Pittsburgh can still be categorized as a “creature of the state” and
therefore must derive its land use authority from the second-class city enabling
act.
Philadelphia, on the other hand, has a Home Rule Charter (the “Charter”)
that gives the City “all powers and authority of local self-government” and
“complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal
functions,” as well as “the power to enact ordinances and to make rules and
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regulations necessary and proper for carrying into execution its powers.”  In168
exercising this general grant of authority, the City is empowered to create and
enforce zoning ordinances to provide an orderly method and plan of
development.169
The result is that Pennsylvania has three separate legislative regimes
under which land use controls are adopted. First, the vast majority of
municipalities derive their authority from Pennsylvania’s Municipalities
Planning Code. Second, the City of Pittsburgh derives its authority from the
second-class city legislation.  Third, the City of Philadelphia derives its170
authority from its Charter.  The remainder of this article will attempt to171
analyze the efficacy of the aforementioned legislative regimes in creating
affordable housing in Pennsylvania.
B. Exclusionary Zoning
As mentioned above, the curative amendment process allows landowners
to challenge local zoning ordinances by filing “curative amendments” directly
to the municipality rather than substantively challenging the ordinances in
state and local courts,  allowing for a more effective weapon for proponents172
of affordable housing.  As explained in detail, below, only Pennsylvania’s173
Municipalities Planning Code provides for a curative amendment process.
Consequently, municipalities operating under this legislative regime are, at
least theoretically, in a better position to challenge the deleterious effects of
exclusionary zoning on the creation of affordable housing.
1. Philadelphia’s Home Rule Charter
Section 14-1708 of Philadelphia’s Municipal Code provides that the
enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances will follow, essentially, the
procedures set out in the Charter. The Charter, in turn, provides that “[t]he
City Planning Commission shall prepare proposed zoning ordinances, which
may embody regulations and maps, and amendments thereto, and submit such
proposed zoning ordinances and amendments thereto to the Mayor for
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177. First Class City Home Rule Act of 1949, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13101 (2009).
178. “A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function
not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.” PA.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1143–44. See also Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152, 156
(Pa. 1996).
179. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13131.1 (West 2009).
180. “[T]he term ‘aggrieved person’ does not include taxpayers of the city that are not detrimentally
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development.” Id.
181. Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1145.
182. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 22101–28707 (West 2009).
transmission to the Council.”  Section 5-1006 of the Charter provides the174
Zoning Board of Adjustment with the authority to hear and decide (i) appeals
in zoning matters, (ii) special exceptions to any zoning ordinance, as well as
(iii) variances to any zoning ordinance.175
The Charter was adopted in 1951 pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution  and the enabling First Class City Home Rule Act176
of 1949.  Pennsylvania’s General Assembly, however, retains the power to177
limit the functions performed by Philadelphia under its Charter.  The178
General Assembly exercised this power with its recent enactment of Section
17.1 of the First Class City Home Rule Act (the “Home Rule Act”).  This179
section, among other things, limits parties that are able to appeal the decision
of a zoning hearing board or other board or commission created to regulate
development within a city to (i) the governing board vested with legislative
powers under any charter adopted under the Home Rule Act, and (ii) an
“aggrieved person.”  This restrictive language trumps the broader language180
within the Charter.  As such, the sole method of amending a zoning181
ordinance in the City of Philadelphia is for a taxpayer, aggrieved by
application of the ordinance, to challenge the ordinance in Pennsylvania’s
courts.
2. Second-Class City Legislation
Pennsylvania’s second-class city legislation is contained in Sections
22101 through 28707 of Pennsylvania’s Consolidated Statutes.  The portion182
of this larger legislation of particular relevance to developers of affordable
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housing is contained in Sections 25051 through 25059.  This portion begins183
with the following general mandate:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the
community, cities of the second class are hereby empowered to regulate, restrict or
determine, the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the
percentage of lot that may be built upon, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces,
the density of population, and the location, use and occupancy of buildings, structures
and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.184
To effect this general mandate, cities of the second class are charged to divide
themselves into districts and to regulate within such districts the “erection,
construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, use, or occupancy of buildings,
structures, or land.”  A city planning commission is authorized to185
recommend  the boundaries of these districts and the regulations  to be186 187
enforced within each district.  Ultimately, the council of each second-class188
city must provide for the manner “in which such regulations and restrictions
and the boundaries of such districts shall be determined, established and
enforced, and, from time to time, amended, supplemented or changed.”189
Section 25057 provides a properly appointed board of adjustment the
authority to, “in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and
safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance, in harmony
with its general purpose and intent and in accordance with general or specific
rules therein contained.”  This board of adjustment is given the power to190
“hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which
such board is required to pass under such ordinance.”  A landowner191
aggrieved by a zoning ordinance adopted by a second-class city is subject to
the exclusive statutory remedy provided for by Pennsylvania’s legislature.192
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Specifically, if the board of adjustment finds in favor of the zoning
administrator and against a landowner, she must challenge the zoning
ordinance in Pennsylvania’s courts.  The board of adjustment must abuse its193
discretion to have its decision overturned.194
3. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
In contrast to Philadelphia’s Charter and Pennsylvania’s second class city
legislation,  the MPC provides landowners with a curative amendment195
process through the following language:
A landowner who desires to challenge on substantive grounds the validity of a zoning
ordinance . . . , which prohibits or restricts the use or development of land in which he
has an interest may submit a curative amendment to the governing body with a written
request that his challenge and proposed amendment be heard and decided . . . .196
If the challenge to the current zoning regulation has merit, the governing body
may either (i) accept the amendment, with or without revision, or (ii) adopt an
alternative amendment fashioned to address the defects of the zoning
ordinance being challenged.  Among the several considerations a governing197
body must take into account in deciding whether to accept a landowner’s
curative amendment is, “if the proposal is for a residential use, the impact of
the proposal upon regional housing needs and the effectiveness of the proposal
in providing housing units of a type actually available to and affordable by
classes of person otherwise unlawfully excluded by the challenged provision
. . . .”  If the governing body does not find merit in the challenge, the198
landowner may challenge the zoning ordinance in court.199
C. Zoning Appeals Legislation
Pennsylvania has not enacted legislation shifting the burden of proof to
the municipality denying a permit to show that the affordable housing needs
of the community are met. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in holding that
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the grant of a special exception to a municipality’s zoning ordinance was
valid, explained the standard for reversal is manifest abuse of discretion or an
error of law by the municipality’s board of adjustment.  As Pennsylvania’s200
Supreme Court explains in Blair v. Board of Adjustment:
A special exception is issued for an exceptional use which may be permitted within a
particular district if the board of adjustment determines its availability. Such uses are
made available as a privilege, not as of right, assuming that the requisite facts and
conditions detailed in the ordinance are found to exist. Since its allowance is predicated
on the exercise of prudent discretion by the Board, only a manifest abuse of that
discretion will cause reversal on appeal.201
The only significant difference between the denial of a special exception to a
municipality’s zoning ordinance and the denial of a conditional use is the
jurisdiction in which it falls.  As such, Pennsylvania courts treat the grant of202
a conditional use in much the same way.  As the construction of affordable203
housing will likely give rise to the need for increased densities,  and in turn204
give rise to the need for special exceptions and conditional uses, the current
state of the law in any of three legislative regimes is not particularly beneficial
to the developers of affordable housing.
D. State Regulation of Comprehensive Planning
Municipalities with an adopted comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance
located within a county with an adopted comprehensive plan have the benefit
of Commonwealth agencies considering the documents when reviewing
applications for the funding or permitting of municipal infrastructure or other
facilities.  Short of this marginal benefit, there is apparently no consequence205
to not having a comprehensive plan as such. The three legislative regimes, as
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shown below, do not provide any further incentive to adopt a comprehensive
plan.
1. Philadelphia’s Home Rule Charter
Philadelphia’s city council operates under its home rule charter, which
vests legislative power of the city exclusively in council and provides it the
right to adopt a comprehensive plan relating to zoning within the city.  The206
First Class City Home Rule Act of 1949 provides that zoning regulations:
[S]hall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and designed to lessen
congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers, to promote
health and the general welfare, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the
overcrowding of land, to avoid undue concentration of population, to facilitate the
adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public
requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other
things, to the topography and character of the district, and its peculiar suitability for
particular uses, with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land throughout such city.207
Although this legislation mandates the City employ a comprehensive plan,
Pennsylvania courts have not required local governments to adopt
comprehensives plans, as such, to validate zoning ordinances.  As a result,208
unless Pennsylvania passes legislation that requires the adoption of a
comprehensive plan, as such, this avenue is a dead end to Philadelphia in its
efforts to create affordable housing.
2. Second-Class City Legislation
Pittsburgh’s land use regulations are governed in part by the second class
city legislation and in part by home rule principles.  As such, Pennsylvania’s209
second-class city legislation—granting the City of Pittsburgh the power to
issue land-use regulations—effectively coexists with Pittsburgh’s Municipal
Charter. Regardless of this coexistence, the second-class city legislation will
2010] AFFORDABLE HOUSING OPTIONS 275
210. Pittsburgh, as a city of the second class, shall make land-use regulations “in accordance with
a comprehensive plan.” 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 25053 (2009).
211. See Donahue, 194 A.2d at 611–12.
212. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 10301–10307 (2009).
213. Id. § 10301(a)(2.1).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. Id. § 10301(c).
216. Id.
217. Id. § 10303(c).
be of little help. Although the legislation mandates that the City employ a
comprehensive plan,  Pennsylvania courts have not required local210
governments to adopt comprehensive plans, as such, to validate zoning
ordinances.  Thus, unless Pennsylvania’s legislature passes legislation that211
requires the adoption of a comprehensive plan, as such, this technique is of no
use to the City of Pittsburgh in the creation of affordable housing.
3. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code deals much more in
depth with the requirement of a comprehensive plan, as such.  This212
legislative regime even requires the inclusion of an element aimed to “meet
the housing needs of present residents and of those . . . anticipated to reside
in the municipality.”  This element may include the “accommodation of213
expected new housing in different dwelling types and at appropriate densities
for households of all income levels.”  This plan must be sent to the214
governing bodies of contiguous municipalities as well as to the Center for
Local Government Services every ten years.  Importantly, the Center for215
Local Government Services only uses the plan for informational purposes.216
This requirement has no teeth. To ensure that the comprehensive plan remains
an impotent document, the Municipalities Planning Code provides that no
action of the municipality’s governing body will be invalid or subject to
challenge based upon its inconsistency with such municipality’s
comprehensive plan.217
E. Incentive Zoning, Mandatory Set-Asides, and Housing Linkage Fees
1. Philadelphia’s Home Rule Charter
Philadelphia’s Zoning Code contains an array of incentive zoning
provisions, including ordinances aimed at the promotion of development that
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id. § 10619.1(a) (creating, “as a separate estate in land, the development rights therein, and the same are
(i) “adheres to pro-environment standards, addresses innovations in
transportation and fosters pedestrian and community vitality;”  (ii) provides218
for public gathering and viewing space;  (iii) provides for mixed-use219
development;  (iv) protects historically significant areas;  (v) provides for220 221
ease of pedestrian travel;  (vi) provides for public restrooms;  and222 223
(vii) promotes, albeit indirectly, the development of affordable housing.224
2. Second-Class City Legislation
Implementation of incentive-zoning policies presents the greatest
opportunity for the City of Pittsburgh to aid in the further development of
affordable housing. First, under the home rule provisions, Pittsburgh residents
can amend the City’s charter to include any number of incentives, provided
these incentives to not expand the City’s authority past the limits set out in the
Municipalities Planning Code.
Examples of incentive zoning that are already included in Pittsburgh’s
Municipal Code include the provision of up to 20% of additional floor area
ratio for developments that include transportation facilities or adequate open
space.  Furthermore, the Code includes the opportunity for the transfer of225
development rights within the downtown zoning district.226
3. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, like Philadelphia’s
Home Rule Charter and Pennsylvania’s Second-Class City legislation,
provides for the development and implementation of incentive zoning
provisions within a municipalities zoning ordinances.227
2010] AFFORDABLE HOUSING OPTIONS 277
declared to be severable and separately conveyable from the estate in fee simple to which they are
applicable”); id. § 10705(d) (providing for the standards of planned residential developments to “vary the
density or intensity of land use, otherwise applicable to the land under the provisions of a zoning ordinance
of the municipality within the planned residential development in consideration of . . . (3) the location,
design, type and use of structures proposed”).
IV. CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether America generally, and Pennsylvania in particular,
has an affordable housing problem or a poverty problem. It is fairly clear,
however, that the City of Philadelphia, the City of Pittsburgh, and all
municipalities operating under Pennsylvania’s Municipalities Planning Code
currently have the authority to induce the construction of affordable housing
through inclusionary zoning policies such as incentive zoning, mandatory set-
asides, and housing linkage fees. It is also fairly clear that residents of the City
of Pittsburgh and the City of Philadelphia are at a disadvantage to
municipalities operating under Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
when it comes to challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances.
